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The Strategic Significance of Global Inequality 
 
While the United States enjoyed rapid economic growth during the past 20 years, many poor countries, including some of 
the world's poorest in sub-Saharan Africa, had a generation experiencing an outright decline in living standards. Private consumption 
spending per capita rose by 1.9 percent per year during 1980-1998 in the United States while declining on average by 1.2 percent 
per year in sub-Saharan Africa.1 Is there a "strategic significance" to global inequalities in income levels and economic growth, and, 
if so, which policies might the United States pursue to address those strategic concerns? Focusing on the scope and limitations of 
U.S. foreign assistance as a policy instrument to address global income inequalities is illuminating. 
The economic success of developing countries enhances the well-being of the United States, which has and should more actively 
deploy policy instruments to help support economic success abroad. National interests in successful economic growth abroad are 
multifaceted. Some of these interests are basically economic: the economic success or failure of developing countries determines 
the gains from trade and investment that the United States reaps in its economic relations with those countries. The ramifications for 
the United States, however, of good or bad economic performance among the poor countries go beyond direct economic returns. As 
a general proposition, economic failure abroad raises the risk of state failure as well. When foreign states malfunction, in the sense 
that they fail to provide basic public goods for their populations, their societies are likely to experience steeply escalating problems 
that spill over to the rest of the world, including the United States. Failed states are seedbeds of violence, terrorism, international 
criminality, mass migration and refugee movements, drug trafficking, and disease. 
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If poor countries had reliably stable and functional state institutions, global poverty would remain a powerful humanitarian concern 
but would probably not be a strategic priority of the United States. Alas, poor economic performance abroad has the potential to 
translate into state failure that, in turn, jeopardizes significant U.S. interests. If the United States wants to spend less time responding 
to failed states, as the Bush administration has stated, it will have to spend more time helping them achieve economic success to 
avert state failure. The United States has certain, albeit limited, economic policy instruments at its disposal to help prevent state 
failure abroad. Foreign assistance can play an important role, in certain contexts, but the United States has not used it well for 
decades. 
 
Foreign Economic Performance and U.S. Strategic Interests 
 
Americans would dearly love to believe that the United States can be an island of stability and prosperity in a global sea of poverty 
and unrest. History, however, continues to prove otherwise. One common occurrence has been an economic crisis abroad that leads 
to a collapse of state authority abroad, which in turn has adverse consequences for the United States. The examples are legion. The 
rise of the Bolsheviks to power in 1917 took place in the wake of an economic collapse of wartime czarist Russia. The rise of Hitler 
in 1933 occurred in the midst of the Great Depression that affected Germany especially hard because of its large foreign debt. More 
recently, Yugoslavia disintegrated into regional war not only because of interethnic conflicts, but also because of an economic 
collapse and the descent of the former federal state into hyperinflation in the late 1980s. Political adventurers such as Slobodan 
Milosevic in turn used the economic collapse to grab power. Iraq's declining economic fortunes and rising debt burdens following 
the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s prompted, at least in part, Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. In the 1990s, most of the 
world's violent conflicts, which have been related in one form or another to deep economic crises and their attendant state failures, 
have occurred in Africa.2 
 
I do not want to commit the elementary fallacy of attributing all political failures to economic crises. The shah of Iran was knocked 
from power in 1979 in the midst of an oil boom. Tracing the rise of Lenin or Hitler to power on the basis of economics alone would 
be fatuous. Yet, in practice, economic failure abroad undoubtedly matters greatly and can translate into very large costs for the 
United States in many spheres. 
 
The most comprehensive study of state failure, carried out by the State Failure Task Force established by the Central Intelligence 
Agency in 1994, confirms the importance of economic underpinnings to state failure.3 The 
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task force gave formal definition to state failure (as a case of revolutionary war, ethnic war, genocides or politicides, and adverse or 
disruptive regime changes) and counted all cases during 1957-1994 in countries of 500,000 people or more. The Task Force 
identified 113 cases of state failure. Of all the explanatory variables examined, three were most significant: infant mortality rates, 
suggesting that overall low levels of material well-being are a significant contributor to state failure; openness of the economy, in 
that more economic linkages with the rest of the world diminish the chances of state failure; and democracy, with democratic 
countries showing less propensity to state failure than authoritarian regimes. The linkage to democracy has another strong economic 
aspect, however, because other research has shown strongly that the probability of a country being democratic rises significantly 
with its per capita income level.4 In refinements of the basic study, the task force found that in sub-Saharan Africa, where many 
societies live on the edge of subsistence, temporary economic setbacks (measured as a decline in gross domestic product per 
capita) were significant predictors of state failure. They also found that "partial" democracies, usually in transition from authoritarian 
to fully democratic institutions, were particularly vulnerable to collapse. Similar conclusions have been reached in studies on 
African conflict, which find that poverty and slow economic growth raise the probability of conflict.5 
 
Types of Economic Failure 
 
Distinguishing several kinds of economic failure abroad and then tracing their various strategic implications for the United States is 
useful and will assist later discussion about whether the United States has policy instruments to address the root causes of foreign 
state collapse or whether we must satisfy ourselves with treating the outcomes instead. Four types of economic failure that lead to 




A poverty trap is a condition, seemingly paradoxical, in which a poor country is simply too poor to achieve sustained economic 
growth. Many countries in Africa are in this situation. Economic growth depends on minimum standards of health, education, and 
infrastructure in order to attract the new investments and technology that in turn are needed to raise income levels. Some 
impoverished countries are too poor to provide the basic public goods of minimally acceptable health and education, much less 
physical infrastructure. In these settings, the state cannot fulfill its basic tasks of help- 
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ing to keep the population safe, healthy, and educated. Why do some poor countries succumb to such a trap and others do not? 
Physical ecology probably plays a role. Africa is uniquely hampered by extreme conditions of disease and low food productivity that 




State bankruptcy is the condition in which the state cannot service its current debts. Bankruptcy almost always results from 
indebtedness to foreign rather than domestic creditors of the state, because domestic debts denominated in the national currency can 
generally be serviced through printing money. In this case, high inflation rather than a debt-servicing interruption is the consequence. 
State bankruptcy has powerful destabilizing effects on society, more destabilizing than almost any other peacetime economic 
malady. Bankrupt states cannot provide basic public goods (health, education, courts, police), maintain troop loyalties, use state 
revenues to buy off political opposition figures, or make budget transfers to keep allied parties or regions within a governing 
coalition. The biggest problem from the point of view of the state is the lack of an international equivalent to Chapter 9 of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code, in which a municipality can win a time-out on debt servicing, followed later by a write-down of debts, with the 
U.S. Bankruptcy Court protecting the municipality during this time against a disruption of public services. State bankruptcy has 
repeatedly contributed to revolutions (France in 1789); loss of sovereignty (Egypt in 1882); collapse of empires (Ottoman Empire 




LIQUIDITY CRISIS  
 
A liquidity crisis is a sudden reversal of capital flows -- usually short-term private-sector loans -- that leads to an intense contraction 
of the economy despite long-term solvency and generally adequate fundamental economic conditions. The so-called emerging 
markets experienced repeated liquidity crises in the 1990s (Mexico in 1995; Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand in 1997), causing 
extremely abrupt and deep declines of gross national product (GNP) and, at least in the case of Indonesia, provoking a dramatic 
regime change and internal violence. These crises were difficult to predict in part because they did not have obvious roots in 
state-sector weakness, although they contributed to state instability after the fact. 
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TRANSITION CRISIS  
 
The fourth major cause of economic failure that can lead to state failure is a crisis of transition, when political and economic 
regimes are making a fundamental institutional change. Examples include the transition from communism in Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union, recovery from war (especially from defeat), transition from colonial rule to state sovereignty, transition from 
authoritarian rule to democratic rule, and succession struggles after the collapse of along-standing regime (such as the fall of 
Suharto after 32 years in power). These transitions destabilize societies directly in myriad ways, but also indirectly by sundering 
usual paths of economic exchange. Almost all transitions are characterized by extreme uncertainty about the future and therefore an 
absence of consolidation of any particular set of institutional arrangements. When the future is "up for grabs," moreover, 
self-fulfilling expectations can play a dominant role in determining the future path of developments. A regime expected to succeed 
can thereby succeed, as supporters flock to the "winner." A regime expected to fall can fall because of the reticence of potential 
supporters to rally to the cause of a "loser." The State Failure Task Force found that, in Africa, the most dangerous political 
condition leading to future state failure was indeed a state of transition. "Partial" democracies were more likely to fail than au-
thoritarian or fully democratic regimes. 
 
Ramifications of State Failure for U.S. Strategic Interests 
 
Economic failure abroad, leading to state failure, significantly affects U.S interests in military, economic, health-related, and 





If we compare the dates of U.S. military engagement with the timing of state failures according to the State Failure Task Force, we 
find that virtually every case of U.S. military intervention abroad since 1960 has taken place in a developing country that had 
previously experienced a case of state failure.7 (For these purposes, military intervention includes any use of U.S. troops abroad, 
whether for direct combat, peacekeeping, evacuation of civilians, or 
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protection of U.S. property, and so forth.) In many cases, the linkages from economic collapse to state failure to U.S. military 
engagements could not be clearer. Yugoslavia collapsed in part because of dire macroeconomic instability at the end of the 1980s, a 
point noted recently by the U.S. ambassador at the time, Warren Zimmermann.8 Of course, security considerations now include 
much more than the engagement of military forces to encompass terrorist threats and arms proliferation. 
 
ECONOMIC LOSSES  
 
Adam Smith noted more than two centuries ago in Wealth of Nations that a country's prosperity benefits directly from the 
prosperity of other nations. Just as "private people who want to make a fortune never think of retiring to the remote and poor 
provinces of the country," so too "[a] nation that would enrich itself by foreign trade is certainly most likely to do so when its 
neighbors are all rich, industrious, and commercial nations."9  The United States has huge economic stakes in the developing world 
that are jeopardized by state failure abroad. The U.S. Commerce Department estimates the market value of U.S. foreign direct 
investments to be $2.1 trillion, of which $500 billion is in developing countries. Around 41 percent of U.S. exports in 1999 went to 
developing countries, up from 35 percent in 1990. Exports to developing countries grew by 8.5 percent during 1990-1999, 
compared with 5.9 percent to industrialized countries. 
 
Business operations abroad are heavily affected by host-country instability, poverty, and even disease. A Business Week profile of 
Exxon-Mobil on April 9, 2001, gives several examples of that company's projects facing significant local complexities, and 
decades-long delays, in Russia, China, Indonesia, Angola, and Chad, among other places. A risk assessment consultancy firm 
recently argued that "sufferers from AIDS may not scruple to commit violent crimes because they have little reason to fear the 
consequences. In some cases ... travelers from the developed world are attacked not only because they are potentially lucrative 
targets but because they are seen as the cause of the poor economic circumstances."10 
 
INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND DRUG TRAFFICKING 
 
State failure is both a cause and consequence of international criminality, including money laundering and international drug 
trafficking. Failed states are easy prey for criminal groups that seize widespread control of drug smuggling operations, and some 
states such as Colombia have lost control over internal territories to insurgencies supported in part by proceeds of the drug trade. 
 










Economic collapse and state failure are major contributors to environmental degradation of strategic concern to the United States. 
For example, tropical deforestation-with serious consequences resulting in loss of biodiversity and long-term climate change-is 
caused in part by population pressures in poor agrarian regions that lead to clear-cutting of forests to make way for peasant 
agricultural sites. Most of the clear-cut land, alas, is unsuitable for intensive agriculture and is quickly abandoned, with devastating 
long-term ecological consequences. Because of state failure, and the lack of viable economic alternatives in these economies, en-
vironmental regulations are generally not enforceable or are easily corrupted. Some of the earth's most important zones of high 
biodiversity are at extreme risk because they lie precisely within failed states. In 1988, ecologist Norman Myers identified 25 
regions in the world with exceptionally high species endemism. Many of these regions are within states, such as Brazil, Bolivia, 
Colombia, China, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, South Africa, Turkey, and Venezuela, suffering under severe 





Many of the poorest countries in the world, and especially societies with state failure, are subject to horrific conditions of disease. 
Like international crime, the disease burden is both a cause and consequence of economic and political failures. A heavy 
infectious-disease burden, such as year-round transmission of malaria, causes a sustained reduction in economic growth for many 
reasons: individual workers are less productive, children are much less likely to finish school and to reach their cognitive potential, 
sectors such as tourism and agriculture are directly affected, and foreign investors are deterred. State collapse feeds these problems 
because failed states lack the financial and institutional means to deliver vital public health services. The AIDS pandemic has ravaged 
sub-Saharan Africa in part because no African government has the means to fight this scourge with its own resources, and donors 
have generally not provided sufficient resources.  As a recent National Intelligence Estimate on the global infectious disease threat 
clearly indicates, the United States stands at risk as a result of the uncontrolled spread of infectious disease in the poorest countries 
and 
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failed states12  Risks to the United States include direct financial costs as it responds to the epidemic crises abroad; destabilization 
of foreign societies as a result of the crippling disease burden; and the spread of deadly pathogens, including multi-drug-resistant 
strains, across international borders. Notably, Europe has already spent billions of dollars combating "mad cow" disease and will now 
spend vast sums fighting foot-and-mouth disease in European cattle and sheep. AIDS, of course, illustrates a newly emergent 
pathogen that arrived from Africa and has caused immense suffering and economic loss in the United States (although only a small 
fraction of the human devastation that has occurred in Africa itself). One can only wonder whether better public health surveillance 
and medical treatment, along with a healthier general population in Africa, might have  controlled the epidemic much earlier, and 
either slowed or stopped its introduction to other parts of the world. 
 
 
Addressing Foreign Economic Failure 
 
Surprising as it may seem, the United States lacks a policy framework for translating its strategic interests in foreign economic 
performance into foreign policy actions. Because foreign economic failure leads to state failure that in turn has adverse 
implications for national security, trade and investment, international crime, drug trafficking, and infectious disease, one might 
suppose that the United States would have developed policy instruments to address preventable or remediable cases of foreign 
economic failure. One would hope that economic, security, and foreign policy considerations would also be well integrated in 
national foreign policy making. In fact, economic policymaking vis-a-vis the developing world has largely operated outside any 
long-term foreign policy framework. 
 
A proper policy framework must start with a hard-nosed assessment of what the United States can and cannot accomplish in support 
of economic development abroad. For example, as rich as the United States is, direct income transfers from the United States to 
poor countries can make relatively little difference to their per capita income levels. To illustrate this statement, if the United States 
decides to spend another $20 billion per year on aid for the 2.4 billion people in low-income countries, that act would amount to 
less than $10 per person in the recipient countries. Because GNP per person is around $37,000 per year in the United States and 
only $400 
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per year in low-income countries, sizeable income transfers would just be a drop in the bucket of the income gap. 
Nonetheless, foreign assistance can be decisively significant if it helps to unleash long-term economic growth, for example, by 
helping a country escape from a poverty trap or by helping a country in institutional transition to consolidate its economic and 
political reforms. Such uses of foreign assistance depend on a strategic view of the use of such transfers; that strategic sense has 
been largely missing in practice during the past 20 years. Foreign assistance has been poorly targeted (mostly to countries not in a 
poverty trap, so that added assistance makes little difference to long-term growth prospects) and poorly timed (often arriving too 
late to help fragile economies in transition). 
Each of the sources of economic failure poverty trap, state bankruptcy, illiquidity, and transition crisis-requires a distinctive 
policy response from the United States. Consider the problem of a poverty trap, for example, as it afflicts much of sub-Saharan 
Africa. Economic growth does not occur because these countries do not achieve the minimal Standards of health, education, and 
infrastructure. A valid policy instrument, in that case, is a set of large-scale and sustained income transfers from the United States 
and other rich countries targeted on the interlocking crises in health, education, and basic infrastructure. Amazingly, the United 
States gives only a pittance to the poorest countries for the support of basic health and education. In 1999, for example, the United 
States gave the sub-Saharan African countries (49 countries with a combined population of 643 million in 1999) around $78 million 
for health and $63 million for education in official development assistance, according to the data of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development. Total donor aid (from all donors) to sub-Saharan Africa was $836 million for health and $999 
million for education, or little more than $1 per person in each case. In short, the rich countries did nothing significant to help the 
poorest of the poor in Africa break out of the poverty trap. The results were expected: continued economic failure, massive state 
failure, collapsing public health, and pervasive adverse consequences for the United States. 
State bankruptcy, on the other hand, must be handled in a completely different way. Giving short-term transfers to an already 
bankrupt state is fairly useless, as one failed International Monetary Fund (IMF) program after another has sadly demonstrated. 
When a state is buried by external debt, the debt must be reduced for the state to function properly. Both the reality and expectations 
of continued weakness of a failed state make it impossible 
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to achieve political stability when debt overwhelms a government. The outright cancellation of debt becomes imperative. Of course, 
the United States might resist debt relief in the case of a hostile debtor state, but if the United States is truly attempting to foster 
economic recovery abroad, it should regard debt cancellation as a necessary part of its foreign policy arsenal, similar to the situation 
of a bankrupt municipality under the U.S. bankruptcy code. 
 
In the case of illiquidity, the key step is not debt cancellation but a postponement or "timeout" on debt servicing. The continued 
hemorrhaging of debt service payments during a liquidity crisis can cause an extremely sharp collapse of economic output. For 
example, the East Asian emerging markets experienced GNP declines of 6 percent or greater during 1998, not because the 
economies had suffered a collapse of fundamentals, but because the economies were subject to a brutal squeeze on access to 
short-term working capital. The IMF did little to relieve the short-term credit squeeze because it was reluctant to insist on a 
time-out on debt servicing. When that happened as a force majeure, as in Korea in late 1997, economic recovery began sooner. 
 
The main lesson about transitions is that small amounts of help at crucial moments can tip the balance toward successful outcomes. 
A new government may consolidate its democratic gains, or it may collapse into a new authoritarian regime. If the transition gains 
momentum in one of these directions, political forces often rush to the seemingly victorious side, and a self-reinforcing process 
takes over. Because expectations of the direction of change also cause political forces to align themselves one way or another, the 
paths of transition regimes are subject to self-fulfilling prophecies of success or failure. All of this analysis underscores one 
essential point. When the United States is dealing with a transition government-in Nigeria currently, for example-time is of the 
essence. A key use of aid should be to support the consolidation of the new regime, and that goal requires timeliness. Foreign 
assistance should be used to bolster the political authority of the new government, to remove impediments (such as an overhang of 
foreign debt), and generally to build signals of the long-term durability of the new government. 
 
 
Toward a Strategic Use of Foreign Assistance 
 
The United States has rarely wielded foreign assistance as an effective instrument of U.S. foreign policy. During the Cold War, a 
considerable propor- 
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tion of foreign assistance was simply a transfer to U.S. allies as a kind of "thank you" for their continued political support that often 
was not forthcoming. The aid was not well directed toward solving development challenges, and in any event the "thank you’s" were 
often followed by state collapse. Since the early 1980s, and especially since the end of the Cold War, the levels of U.S. donor 
assistance have in fact plummeted. The United States now spends only 0.1 percent of GNP in foreign assistance, and only 0.02 
percent of GNP in assistance for the poorest countries. The United States has become, by far, the stingiest of all rich countries in 
donor aid. The consequences of this miserliness are undermining the long-term vital interests of the United States. 
 
It is time to reconstruct a strategy of foreign assistance that is commensurate with U.S. strategic interests. The United States should 
urgently lead an international effort to help sub-Saharan Africa escape from a poverty trap that has led to a downward spiral of 
disease, falling living standards, and increased conflict, during the past 20 years. More generally, the United States should harmonize 
the decisionmaking of different parts of the U.S. government, including the Departments of Treasury and State, as well as the Office 
of the U.S. Trade Representative, to rebuild our national capacity to support economic development abroad as a vital component of 
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